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Abstract
California’s cap-and-trade system is a vital laboratory for testing the 
effectiveness of this market-driven approach in meeting greenhouse gas emis-
sion reduction goals and the use of forestry-based carbon offsets within these 
systems generally.  Based on this experience, this Article explores one of the pri-
mary challenges, layering offsets with working forest conservation easements, 
which currently limits opportunities to effectively use these tools in concert. 
Ultimately, this market may need to foster and rely on natural linkages with 
working forest conservation easements to develop these offsets and to better 
ensure that the critical societal objectives of these projects are being met.
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Introduction
Over the past several decades, a consensus has been growing regard-
ing the urgent need to substantially reduce anthropocentric greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions in order to limit the environmental, economic, and social 
damage associated with climate change and a warming planet.1  Within the 
United States, California has taken a leadership role in this area with the 2006 
passage of Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act.2  This legisla-
tion was intended to reduce the state’s greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels 
by 2020 (a nearly 30 percent statewide drop).3  In 2010–11, the California Air 
Resources Board (ARB) adopted a cap-and-trade program to place an upper 
bound on GHG emissions in the state and to allow for trading of allowances4 
as well as the use of offsets within this newly created carbon market.5  Offset 
projects enable regulated entities to meet a portion of their reduction goals by 
purchasing environmental credits that have been created to absorb (or offset) 
this marginal amount of emissions through a variety of market-based environ-
mental mechanisms.6  The creation of a mandatory carbon market in California 
provides an ongoing demand for carbon offsets over a sustained period as 
1. See, e.g., Jessica Owley et al., Climate Change Challenges for Land Conservation: 
Rethinking Conservation Easements, Strategies, and Tools, 95 Denv. L. Rev. 727, 727–35 (2018) 
(profiling these challenges).
2. Global Warming Solutions Act, ch. 488, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3419 (codified at Cal. 
Health & Safety Code §§ 38,500–38,599 (2012)).
3. See Dylan Jenkins, Cash for Carbon Revisited, Forest Landowners, May/June 
2015, at 37, http://digital.graphcompubs.com/article/Cash+For+Carbon+Revisited/2002722/0/
article.html [https://perma.cc/7XMY-8PHV].  This significant market represents the “world’s 
eighth-largest economy representing two percent of global GHG emissions.”  Id.
4. See Allowance Allocation, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/allowanceallocation/allowanceallocation.htm [https://perma.cc/3WSJ-FJ5W] 
(explaining the role of allowances under current ARB regulations).
5. See, e.g,. Felicity Barringer, Cap and Trade, the California Way, N.Y. Times (Oct. 
31, 2010), https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/cap-and-trade-the-california-way 
[https://perma.cc/SM9K-CPG4] (explaining the state’s pending adoption of this system); 
see also Envtl. Defense Fund, The Role of Offsets in California’s Cap-and-Trade 
Regulation, Frequently Asked Questions (2012), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/
OffsetsPercentagesFAQFinal%20041612.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SLL-P6MA] (providing 
overview of the economic rationales behind the offsets and limitations generally).
6. Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate 
Change, 32 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 293, 297 (2008) (providing overview of this concept); see 
also James Salzman et al., Payments for Ecosystems Services: Past, Present and Future, 6 Tex. 
A&M L. Rev. 199, 216–19 (2018) (profiling the challenges facing forest carbon offset projects 
generally).
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GHG emitters in the state work to meet ambitious statutory GHG reduction 
goals.7  To this end, the California carbon market is laying the critical ground-
work for learning what works in using offsets effectively as part of an overall 
strategy to efficiently meet targeted climate-related objectives.
From California’s experience, important lessons can be learned about 
how to design offsets that work in parallel with other conservation finance 
tools.  In particular, forestry-based California carbon offsets (CCOs), projects 
designed to sequester carbon on the working landscape,8 have natural linkages 
with working forest conservation easements, which are generally structured 
to protect these lands in perpetuity while ensuring the use of sustainable for-
estry practices and preventing forest fragmentation.9  Both tools align well with 
sustainable timberland investment strategies, which are similarly designed 
to encourage conservation-minded management of forest resources over a 
 longer-term horizon while providing a return on this investment.10  Given the 
scale of many conservation projects, a variety of conservation finance tools 
are increasingly required to make these larger transactions possible, giving 
timberland investors a significant role in making the economics of these 
projects work.11
7. Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and 
Complementary Policies, 49 Harv. J. Legis. 207, 224–25 (2012).  Some have recently criticized 
the effectiveness of the forest-based offsets in delivering GHG emission reductions.  See 
Will Kane, New Paper: State’s Cap-and-Trade Program is Falling Short of Goals, Berkeley 
News (May 7, 2019), https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/05/07/new-paper-states-cap-and-trade-
program-is-falling-short-of-goals [https://perma.cc/W4QG-Y2L7] (summarizing the work 
of Barbara Haya, a UC Berkeley researcher).  The ARB has expressed objections to this 
work.  See Cal. Air Res. Bd., U.S. Forest Offset Projects 19 (May 30, 2019), https://www.
arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7HK-UPXB] (challeng-
ing the conclusions drawn in this work).  Other researchers have found California’s use 
of forestry-based offsets to have been more effective.  See Chaeri Kim & Thomas Daniels, 
California’s Success in the Socio-Ecological Practice of a Forest Carbon Offset Option to 
Mitigate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 1 Socio-Ecological Prac. Res. 125, 135 (2019) (explor-
ing California’s approach and success in this area in meeting its initial goals for lower carbon 
emissions).
8. Elizabeth L. Wroblicka, Selling Carbon Offsets: A Potential Source of Funding 
for Forest Conservation, Saving Land (2015), at 22; see also Will Price, Saving the Sink: 
Conserving Stored Carbon on Private Forest Lands, Pinchot Inst. for Conservation, http://
www.pinchot.org/doc/532 [https://perma.cc/CF53-F8DZ] (profiling these potential benefits).
9. Dan Tesini, Working Forest Conservation Easements, 41 Urb. Law. 359, 359–62 
(2009) (providing overview of this tool); Jessica Owley & Stephen J. Tulowiecki, Who Should 
Protect the Forest?: Conservation Easements in the Forest Legacy Program, 33 Pub. Land & 
Resources L. Rev. 47, 65 (2012) (profiling working forest conservation easements generally).
10. See John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the 
Environment, 26 J. Land, Resources, and Envtl L. 1, 18–19 (2005) (exploring the “rise of 
large investor funds focused on private timberlands of interest to the conservation commu-
nity.”).
11. See Credit Suisse et al., Conservation Finance From Niche to Mainstream: The 
Building of an Institutional Asset Class 8–11 (2016) (discussing this growing need).
64 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  V38:1
There are, however, barriers that currently limit the opportunities 
for sustainability-focused timberland investors interested in carrying out 
forestry-based CCO projects to pursue the conveyance of working forest con-
servation easements.12  Some of these barriers are regulatory, such as ensuring 
additionality (benefit beyond what is provided by the working forest con-
servation easement), but can complicate efforts to layer these tools.13  Other 
challenges are transactional, particularly the considerable cost of quantifying 
and verifying the carbon sequestered by a working forest.14  These costs can 
hopefully be reduced over time as ARB and other participants in the Califor-
nia carbon market learn how to more efficiently and effectively establish and 
document the benefits associated with forestry-based CCO projects.15
For timberland investors pursuing sustainability-related objectives, over-
coming the roadblocks related to the integrated use of forestry-based CCOs 
and working forest conservation easements is important since layering these 
tools has strong potential to provide both climate-related benefits as well as 
important landscape protection and conservation benefits.16  To explore this 
12. For a brief overview of these investment forms, see Chris Martin, Could a Mature 
Timberland Asset Class Spur Conservation?, Conservation Finance Network (July 25, 
2018), https://www.conservationfinancenetwork.org/2018/07/25/could-mature- timberland-
asset-class-spur-conservation [https://perma.cc/JY49-RYTV].  The use of carbon offset sales 
as part of a timberland investment strategy is not yet a “mainstream” approach, but a certain 
subset of these investors, defined here loosely as sustainable timberland investors, actively 
seeks to employ this tool as part of its funding mix, and depending on the longterm strength 
of this market, more mainstream timberland investors may seek to access this market.  Id.
13. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95973(a)(2) (discussing additionality requirements); 
Cal. Air Res. Bd., Compliance Offset Protocol, Forestry-Based Protocol § 3.4, https://
ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/protocols/usforest/forestprotocol2015.pdf [https://perma.
cc/XZ6K-MNSB] [hereinafter Forestry-Based Protocol]; see also Jessica Campbell et al., 
Barriers to Achieving Additionality in Carbon Offsets: A Regulatory Risk Perspective, 61 J. 
Envtl. Planning and Mgmt. 2570 (2018) (discussing this challenge).
14. Dylan Jenkins, The Business Case for California Forest Carbon Offsets, The 
Forestry Source, 7 (2013); see also John Dillon, Money Growing on Trees?  Vermont Forest 
First in State for California Carbon Market, VPR (June 26, 2019), https://www.vpr.org/post/
money-growing-trees-vermont-forest-first-state-california-carbon-market [https://perma.cc/
YD3C-EUKN] (exploring the transaction costs for creating forestry-based CCOs on a 5400 
acre Vermont forest conserved by the Nature Conservancy (over $200,000)); but see John 
Dillon, Smaller Trees Stump Nature Conservancy’s Carbon Project, VPR (Dec. 11, 2019), 
https://www.vpr.org/post/smaller-trees-stump-nature-conservancys-carbon-project#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/7THF-N9V2] (noting that this project ultimately was not viable in the 
California market based on the developer’s inventory work not meeting anticipated carbon 
volumes).
15. See Envtl. Defense Fund et al., California: An Emissions Trading Case Study 
12–13 (2015), https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/california-case-study-may2015.pdf (dis-
cussing the cost issues associated with creation of these credits generally) [https://perma.cc/
G4KR-X3QW].
16. See also Keeping Maine’s Forests, Adoption of Carbon Credit Programs Among 
SFI Participants in Maine 15–16 (2017) (profiling some of the challenges within the context 
of Maine’s experience with this market).
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issue, this Article first provides a working overview of the forestry-based 
offsets currently allowed within the California carbon market.  Second, this 
Article explores the role of timberland investors in these projects and focuses 
on several significant barriers preventing working lands conservation ease-
ments from working in better tandem with forestry-based CCOs.  Ultimately, 
the efficient creation of forestry-based CCOs on lands secured by working 
forest conservation easements may provide California with a unique opportu-
nity to develop forestry-based CCOs as part of its overall strategy to achieve 
its GHG emission reduction goals while also securing the future of the working 
landscape and forest economy in California and beyond.17
I. Understanding CCOs
A. Carbon Offsets and CCOs Generally
The idea behind offsets in environmental law is to balance public policy 
objectives (here, the reduction/elimination of GHG emissions) against costs 
imposed on industrial firms subject to regulation.18  Requiring an emitter to 
instantly bring its preexisting operations into compliance with an environmen-
tal regulation may be cost prohibitive, but there may be market-driven tools, 
such as the trading of allowances and offsets, that would allow for substantial 
reductions to be achieved more quickly at a lower per unit cost.19  California’s 
cap-and-trade system expressly recognizes these considerations and allows 
emitters to use offsets to meet a portion of their required reductions in emis-
sions—up to 8 percent of the entity’s total compliance goal.20  This amount, 
however, has been subsequently reduced to 4 percent of covered emissions 
17. Id. at 1 (noting that “while the up-front payout from carbon credits can be substan-
tial and a good way to diversify income from forest land, the land managers [surveyed] found 
that costs, risks, and the 100 year commitment required by carbon projects not worthwhile 
at current credit prices.”); Abigail Stecker, Creating a Carbon Sequestration Right: A Legal 
Tool to Enhance the Use of Forest-Based Carbon Offsets, 18 Hastings Envtl. L.J. 292, 310–11 
(2012) (discussing permanence requirements in CCO projects and the challenges of project 
design).
18. James L. Olmstead, Carbon Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon Offsets in 
Conservation Easements, 29 J. Land, Resources & Envtl. L. 121, 122–23 (2009) (explaining 
carbon offsets generally); see also Matthew D. Hurteau et al., Aligning Ecology and Markets 
in the Forest Carbon Cycle, 11 Frontiers Ecology & Env’t. 37, 37–42 (2013) (profiling this 
tool within forest carbon markets).
19. Heather Lovell & Diana Liverman, Understanding Carbon Offset Technologies, 
15 New Pol. Econ. 255, 255–73 (2010) (explaining carbon offsets generally).  From a design 
perspective, to be effective, “the annual emissions caps [under a cap and trade program] must 
decline over time to compel emitters to reduce overall emissions.”  Kim & Daniels, supra 
note 7, at 125.
20. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Chapter 6: What are the Requirements for Offset Credits 
and How Are They Issued? 47 (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/ 
offsets/chapter6.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ERD-PEH9] [hereinafter Requirements for Offset 
Credits].
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from 2021–25, and to 6 percent from 2026–30; half of these offsets must 
directly provide air and water quality benefits within California (or be state-
based projects).21
California has developed protocols that must be followed for the vari-
ous forms of CCOs.22  To date, ARB has adopted six offset protocols: (1) ozone 
depleting substances; (2) agricultural methane gas destruction; (3) urban for-
estry; (4) mine methane capture; (5) rice cultivation; and (6) forestry-based 
projects.23  As of March 2019, ARB has issued over 150 million offset credits 
under these protocols.24  The U.S. forestry-based protocol has been the most 
frequently utilized, accounting for nearly 120 million of the 150 million total 
CCOs created as of March 2019.25
B. Forestry-Based CCOs
Within California’s U.S. forestry-based subcategory, there are three dis-
tinct paths for qualifying a CCO: (1) afforestation/reforestation (restoring 
forests to denuded land); (2) avoided conversion (preventing land from being 
developed or converted away from forest use); and (3) improved forest man-
agement (projects designed to maintain or increase carbon stocks relative to 
the land’s  baseline upon enrollment) (IFM projects).26  Each recognizes the 
role that forests can play in providing ecosystem services as a form of carbon 
sink.27  To establish an offset project under the Forestry-Based Protocol, which 
allows for the sale of CCOs, “projects must be on forests that occur naturally 
in a region, have forest management above the standards required by law, and 
create climate gains that endure for at least 100 years.”28  All forest offset proj-
ects are effectively longterm carbon supply agreements between the forest 
owner, offset buyer, and the state of California to (1) maintain or increase 
project carbon stocking levels present at the time of project commence-
ment, (2) demonstrate sustainable forestry products as defined by California’s 
21. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 38562(c)(2)(E)(i).
22. See Compliance Offset Program, Cal. Air Res. Bd., https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/
capandtrade/offsets/offsets.htm [https://perma.cc/L74T-JEQF] (providing overview of the 
various protocols and project types).
23. Ann Carlson & Danny Cullenward, Indep. Emissions Mkt. Advisory Comm., 
Subcommittee Report on Offsets (2018), https://calepa.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/
sites/6/2018/09/6d.-IEMAC_Meeting_Materials_9-21-18__Subcommittee_Report_on_
Offsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ4S-FHTK] [hereinafter IEMA Report].
24. Compliance Offset Program, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Laurel Bates et al., Accounting for Harvested Wood Products in a Forest Offset 
Program: Lessons from California, 27 J. Forest Econ. 50, 51 (2017) (profiling the three 
paths for forestry-based CCOs); see also Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 1.1(a) 
(explaining that the purpose of the protocol is to “quantify greenhouse gas emission reduc-
tions and greenhouse gas removal enhancements associated with the sequestration of carbon 
achieved by increasing and/or conserving forest carbon stocks.”).
27. Kim & Daniels, supra note 7, at 126.
28. Wroblicka, supra note 8, at 4.
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compliance offset protocol for U.S. forests, and (3) monitor and independently 
audit project compliance with all requirements.29
For forestry-based CCO projects, the first step is generally to conduct a 
timber inventory, which can be labor-intensive and costly, but critical for mod-
eling and establishing a forest’s carbon baseline.30  Based on this field work 
and modeling, a project plan will need to be developed, approved by ARB, and 
submitted to an approved carbon registry.31  It is estimated that at 2019 prices 
for CCOs, a minimum of 5,000 acres is needed to make a project cost-effective 
from an investment standpoint, given the substantial project and compliance 
costs.32  One offset credit is created for every metric ton of atmospheric CO2 
that is sequestered, which can then be directly sold to an emitter to meet its 
compliance obligations.33
One of ARB’s primary objectives is ensuring that offset projects have 
lasting impacts, and a few key concepts help to explain how ARB achieves this 
goal.  First, the Forestry-Based Protocol require that the GHG emission reduc-
tions be permanent, which is defined as lasting at least one hundred years.34 
Relatedly, forestry-based projects have a defined project life of one hundred 
years during which the forestry-based project must continue to monitor, report, 
and verify offset data.35  There are three potential exceptions to this minimum 
time commitment: (1) the project terminates due to an unintentional rever-
sal (causing the carbon stocks to fall below the baseline carbon levels); (2) the 
project is sold to an entity that does not take over the project’s responsibili-
ties and commitments (which will result in credits being retired and trigger a 
29. See Jenkins, Cash for Carbon Revisited supra note 3, at 37; see also Forestry-Based 
Protocol, supra note 13, §  3.1(a)(2).  To date, “[c]hallenging eligibility requirements for 
[AC projects] and high capitalization costs and extended ROI horizon for [AR projects] 
make these two project types a limited opportunity for most forest owners.  At least over the 
next several years, IFM projects will continue to contribute most of the compliance offsets.” 
Dylan Jenkins, Carbon Offsets: A Viable Opportunity for Forest Landowners?, Consultant, 
2018, at 22, 23, [hereinafter Jenkins, Carbon Offsets].  Based on this predominance, to the 
extent that this Article refers to forestry-based CCOs, unless otherwise specifically noted, 
references are to IFM CCOs.  See also Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 2.2 (sum-
marizing requirements for IFM based projects).
30. See Jenkins, Carbon Offsets, supra note 29; Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 
13.
31. Id.
32. See Jenkins, Carbon Offsets, supra note 29, at 25.
33. Katherine Hsia-Kiung et al, Envtl. Defense Fund, Carbon Market California: 
A Comprehensive Analysis Of The Golden State’s Cap-and-Trade Program 3 (2014), 
http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/ca-cap-and-trade_1yr_22_web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AD4X-EDZ5].
34. Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 3.5.  This permanence requirement is 
met through at least three mechanisms: (1) monitoring and verification; (2) the requirement 
for compensation/replacement to address losses associated with intentional reversals; and 
(3) the buffer account requirement to provide protection against unintentional loss of car-
bon sequestration.  Id.
35. Id. at § 1.2(a)(42).
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replacement obligation); and (3) the project is voluntarily terminated (which 
also results in retired credits).36  Overall, these three concepts (permanence, 
project life, and minimum time commitment) collectively work to ensure lon-
glasting carbon reduction goals are achieved while preserving some flexibility 
to address future uncertainty.
As far as working-forest conservation easements are concerned, for 
avoided conversion projects, ARB requires the landowner to enter a quali-
fied conservation easement that provides ARB with the right to enforce the 
easement against the landowner if the carbon goals are not met.37  For IFM 
or afforestation projects, recording a qualified conservation easement may 
help reduce project risk  and, in turn, the level of required contribution to the 
buffer/reserve pool.38  To ensure that the required levels of GHG reductions 
are met over time, a certain percentage of the offsets created by each proj-
ect, typically 10–20 percent of the total, are placed in a buffer/reserve pool 
to address risks associated with unintentional reversals/release of the seques-
tered carbon (such as through a wildfire event).39  This “reserve” amount will 
potentially be less if a qualified conservation easement is entered into on the 
theory that a conservation easement better assures the project’s permanence.40 
“Credits are removed from the buffer and sold as the risk of the forest not 
meeting its sequestration targets declines.”41
Beyond permanence considerations, the protocols also serve to ensure 
carbon reduction impacts are actually achieved.42  For projects where commer-
cial logging is to occur, sustainable forestry practices must be followed, which 
include (1) maintaining a management plan across all landowner holdings that 
36. Id. at § 3.5.1(b).
37. See, e.g., Cal. Air Res. Bd., ARB Compliance Offset Program, U.S. Forest 
Offset Protocol, Frequently Asked Questions 8, https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
protocols/usforest/resources/faq_102913_post.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFW3-EVHS] [here-
inafter Frequently Asked Questions] (elaborating on the requirements for a Qualified 
Conservation Easements under the ARB’s jurisdiction); see also Jenkins, Carbon Offsets, 
supra note 29, at 25 (noting that an IFM project may receive more offsets if a “qualified” 
conservation easement is utilized).  Notably, the protocol language is not limited to carbon 
goals, it provides ARB the right to enforce any terms of the conservation easement (some of 
which may not involve carbon).  See Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 1.2(a)(44).
38. Forest Carbon in California’s Cap and Trade Program, Climate Action Reserve 
(Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.climateactionreserve.org/blog/2015/01/05/forest-carbon-in- 
californias-cap-and-trade-program [https://perma.cc/33JE-VHAV].
39. Hurteau et al., supra note 18, at 39; see also Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 
13, § 3.5 (discussing project life and identification of reversal events).
40. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 37, at 24 (discussing this risk assess-
ment); Letter from California Coalition of Land Trusts to Kate Gordon, Governor’s Office of 
Planning & Research 11–12 (Nov. 22, 2019) (on file with Authors) [hereinafter CCLT Letter] 
(regarding implementation failure for qualified conservation easements and carbon offsets 
and the current barriers blocking the use of conservation easements to minimize diversion 
of CCOs into the buffer pool).
41. Kim & Daniels, supra note 7, at 131.
42. IEMA Report, supra note 23, at 2.
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is: (a) certified under SFI, ATFS, or FSC;43 (b) prepared and enrolled under a 
state of federal forestry program (e.g. a Stewardship Program or land use tax-
ation program); or (c) adheres to an uneven-harvest as defined by the offset 
protocol; and (2) that even-aged harvests defined as 50BA or less residual 
stocking be no greater than 40 acres with a green-up buffer requirement.”44 
Finally, ARB has a significant ongoing enforcement mechanism in that it 
requires forest owners to replace previously issued CCOs if the project is ter-
minated due to an “intentional” reversal during the enrollment period.45
In all, going through the feasibility and verification stages can be daunt-
ing, but as discussed in the following Part, the CCO requirements have the 
potential to mesh well with working forest conservation easements—whose 
sale can provide another funding stream to timberland investors seeking to 
produce investment returns based on sustainable land management practices.
II. Current Barriers to Timberland Investor Creation of CCOs
Despite market incentives and the strong potential for lands managed by 
timberland investors to participate in the offset market, there are several mate-
rial barriers to entry including the challenges associated with layering working 
lands conservation easements with forestry-based CCOs.46  This Part profiles 
the role that sustainability-focused timberland investors can play in conserva-
tion finance generally before exploring these barriers in more depth.
A. Timberland Investors and Conservation Projects
Timberland investors, at least those focused on sustainable forest manage-
ment, play a few important roles in conservation projects and in conservation 
43. Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 3.1(a)(1).  These abbreviated entities 
are: (1) the Sustainable Forestry Initiative; (2) the American Tree Farm System; and (3) the 
Forest Stewardship Council.
44. See Jenkins, Carbon Offsets, supra note 29, at 25 (explaining these program require-
ments).
45. The Climate Trust, Liability Shift for Forestry Credits Expected to Have Minimal 
Market Effect, CaliforniaCarbon.info (May 3, 2014) https://www.californiacarbon.info/
liability-shift-forestry-credits-expected-minimal-market-effect [https://perma.cc/AHS7-
KQGB] (explaining the impacts of reversal for intentional actions).  Unintentional reversal, 
or reversal for events such as forest fires, are covered through the application of the buffer 
pool contributions which are determined at the project’s outset based upon various risk fac-
tors.  Id.
46. This Article focuses on several challenges specifically related to timberland 
investors.  One issue that is not addressed, but that creates challenges for a larger class of 
potentially interested landowners, is the definition of how to define a “Forest Owner” under 
the Forestry-Based Protocol.  The current definition is quite broad, which raises concerns 
regarding successor liability for reversals from the easement-holding community and may 
complicate further division of the property. 17 CCR § 95983.  The California Coalition of 
Land Trusts is currently working with ARB to try to narrow this definition to make it culpa-
bility-based (rather than the current joint and several liability standard).  See CCLT Letter, 
supra note 40.
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finance generally.47  First, these entities often purchase these forested lands in 
fee simple.48  If a timberland investor purchases the tract in coordination with 
a conservation organization, the conservation organization is able to assemble 
funding to remove the immediate threat of development with a meaningful 
degree of confidence in its ability to actually protect the land at the project’s 
conclusion.49  Second, lands conserved with a working forest conservation 
easement, the conservation outcome typically targeted by institutional inves-
tors, must have a productive use and a landowner capable of complying with 
a forest management plan.50  Institutional timberland investors often have the 
professional and technical ability to comply with these requirements and can 
be valuable partners in facilitating the management of these projects once 
conserved.51  Overall, timberland investors working in this area can be logical 
longterm partners for land trusts and federal and state conservation agencies 
in facilitating conservation on the ground, assisting with the financing models 
of these unique projects, and managing these resources once protected.52
Sustainable timberland investors also need to provide their investors 
with a return on their substantial investment in both the purchase and ongo-
ing management of these forest lands, which necessitates using conservation 
47. Kelley Hamrick, Ecosystem Marketplace, State of Private Investment 
in Conservation 2016 (Dec. 2016), https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/03/2016SOPICReport_FINAL_Full-REV.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CG5-
YXBA] (providing overview); see also Peter Stein, Coal. for Private Inv. in Conservation, 
Conservation Investment Blueprint: Forest Landscape Conservation, Restoration, 
and Sustainable Timber Production 3 (Jan. 2019), http://cpicfinance.com/wp- content/
uploads/2019/01/CPIC-Blueprint-Forest-Conservation-and-Sustainable-Timber-
Production-by-Lyme-Timber-Company.pdf [https://perma.cc/52AK-FAGG] (profiling busi-
ness models for these types of sustainable timber investments).
48. See, e.g., Sofia Faruqi & Caroline Gagne, Can Money Grow on Trees?, Stanford 
Social Innovation Review (Jan. 18, 2018), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/can_money_grow_
on_trees [https://perma.cc/FAE3-EZYN] (exploring the work of Lyme Timber in partnering 
with various states to protect working lands).
49.  See, e.g., John Burrows et al., Increasing the Engagement of Large Private 
Forestland Owners in Conservation Management (Duke Nicholas Institute, Working Paper 
No. 17–07, 2017), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_wp_17-
07.pdf (profiling this potential point of intersecting goals); see also Stein, supra note 47, at 3 
(explaining the complicated deal blended finance structure of these private equity deals).
50. See Brenda Lind, Using Conservation Easements to Protect Working Forests, 
Exchange, Spring 2001, at 10, 13 (discussing forest management plans and the use of this 
mechanism within working forest conservation easements).
51. Shea Flanagan, New Impact Investing Partnership Fuels Ranch Conservation, 
Conservation Finance Network (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.conservationfinancenetwork.
org/2018/12/19/new-impact-investing-partnership-fuels-ranch-conservation [https://perma.
cc/4EYV-4TTX] (profiling the role of investment firms in providing transactional experi-
ence).
52. See Kevin Harnish, Economic Benefits of the Working Forest Fund, The 
Conservation Fund (Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.conservationfund.org/blog/land/1685- 
economic-benefits-of-the-working-forest-fund [https://perma.cc/WMW4-KPRM] (profiling 
TCF’s work with timberland investors to protect working forests).
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finance strategies.53  For sustainability-focused timberland investors, this some-
times involves the sale of a working forest conservation easement.54  This 
transaction allows the timberland investor to continue carrying out sustain-
able harvesting activities pursuant to a forest management plan, but prevents 
the land from being developed or converted to nonforest use.55  The appraised 
value of this conservation easement will hinge on the valuation of the land 
before and after the conservation easement is conveyed.56  This differential 
can be significant, providing the timberland investor with an early return and 
lowering the price of the land for a future buyer (feeding into the revenue 
model for the timberland investment).57  Overall, working forest conservation 
easements can play an important role in making sustainable timberland invest-
ments work.  However, other conservation finance tools, such as CCOs, also 
have a potentially important catalytic role as the value of these additional eco-
system services are recognized and capitalized.58
B. Timberland Investors and Forestry-Based CCOs
The unique role that timberland investors can play in the California 
carbon market is driven by the fact that these firms own and control forest 
assets at an unusually large size and scale.59  The scale of institutional timber-
land investor ownership allows for offsets to be efficiently produced.60  Thus, 
53. Vivian Marino, For Some Investors, Money Grows on Trees, N.Y. Times (May 27, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/realestate/commercial/27sqft.html [https://
perma.cc/8DFH-74KG] (discussing this form of investment).
54. Peter Stein, Conservation Easements, Silviculture Magazine, Winter 2010, 6 (dis-
cussing this form of easement).
55. See Elizabeth Byers & Karin M. Ponte, The Conservation Easement Handbook 
208–09 (2d ed. 2005).
56. See, e.g., Tom Morgan, Duncan & Brown Real Estate, Appraisals for Working 
Land Easements: Considerations in Oregon, Oregon Land Trusts (Oct. 2017), https://
oregonlandtrusts.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Appraisals-for-working-land-easements-
in-Oregon-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF7E-AXRE] (discussing appraisals of working lands 
generally).
57. Peter Howell, Seeing the Forest for the Trees: The Future of Investing in the North 
Woods, 16 Maine Policy Rev. 38, 41(2007).
58. See, e.g., Carbon Program, Downeast Lakes Land Trust, https://downeastlakes.
org/forest-activities/carbon-program [https://perma.cc/XDY4-ZTGB] (profiling the impor-
tance of carbon offsets to a Maine-based conservation project); see also William S. Keeton 
et al., Vermont Forest Carbon: A Market Opportunity for Forestland Owners 3 (2019) 
(explaining that aggregation is not allowed under ARB protocols—requiring more scale and 
size for projects seeking to access this market).
59. Derek W. Thompson & Eric N. Hansen, Institutional Pressures and an Evolving 
Forest Carbon Market, 21 Bus. Strategy & the Env’t 351 (Sept. 2012) (discussing these 
opportunities within private-owned forests). But see Kristell A. Miller et al., An Assessment 
of Forest Landowner Interest in Selling Forest Carbon Credits in the Lake States USA, 25 
Forest Pol’y & Econ. 113, 113–22 (Dec. 2012) (profiling the challenges to smaller market 
entrants, specifically family forest landowners, in accessing these markets).
60. Erin C. Kelly & Marissa B. Schmitz, Forest Offsets and the California Compliance 
Market: Bringing an Abstract Ecosystem Good to Market, 75 Geoforum 99, 99–110 (Oct. 
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the scale of operations and goals of sustainability-focused timberland inves-
tors make their landholdings well positioned to create forestry-based CCOs.61 
Since a number of challenges, which this Article will explore in the following 
Part, currently limit sustainability-focused timberland investors from creating 
CCOs, this Article focuses on the issues with layering offsets on lands that are 
either conserved or are targeted to be conserved with working forest conser-
vation easements.
C. Addressing the Sequencing Issues Involving Layering Forestry-Based 
CCOs and Working Forest Conservation Easements
At present, the interplay between forestry-based CCOs and working forest 
conservation easements is a material barrier to increased sustainability-fo-
cused timberland investor participation in the carbon market.  Contribution 
of a qualified conservation easement is intended to allow the landowner to 
be subject to a reduced buffer pool contribution requirement given that the 
conservation is limiting reversal risk, but this has seldom, if ever, happened in 
practice.  The challenges to integrated use vary based upon the transaction’s 
timing, and fall into three general categories: (1) preexisting working forest 
conservation easements; (2) working forest conservation easements to be con-
veyed in connection with a forestry-based CCO project (the parallel track 
option); and (3) post forestry-based CCO working forest conservation ease-
ment transactions.
1. Preexisting Conservation Easements
Lands that have already been conserved are still eligible, depending on 
the terms of the conservation easement, for participation in CCO projects.62  To 
qualify, the owner of the conserved lands must agree to specific measures that 
result in an overall increase in carbon stocks (beyond what has already been 
agreed to through a working forest conservation easement).63  It is important in 
forestry-based CCO projects involving land already subject to a conservation 
easement to closely examine the terms of the easement and the conservation 
baseline to determine whether the preexisting restrictions provide sufficient 
flexibility to provide additional carbon benefit (and subsequently generate off-
sets).64  If additional carbon benefits cannot be provided or can only marginally 
2016) (noting the challenges that the complexity of the CCO present to carbon market 
entrants).
61. See Marissa B. Schmitz & Erin C. Kelly, Ecosystem Service Commodification: 
Lessons from California, 16 Global Envtl. Pol. 90, 107 (Nov. 2016) (exploring the political 
balancing in creating the offsets in the California carbon market between various scales of 
land owners).  The party-to-party nature of the sale of these offsets may also lend themselves 
to being sold at greater volume as no commodity market exists for the effective transfer of 
these offsets.  See Jenkins, Carbon Offsets supra note 29, at 26.
62. Jenkins, Carbon Offsets, supra note 29, at 26.
63. Id.
64. Keeton et al., supra note 58, at 19 (discussing the impact and variability of impact 
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be provided, this land may not be an viable target for a CCO project given both 
the transaction costs and the limited additional value that will likely be pro-
vided by the sale of a working-forest conservation easement.65
2. The Parallel Track Option/Challenge
From a sustainability-focused timberland investor’s perspective, the ideal 
scenario likely involves working land that is not already subject to either a 
working forest conservation easement or involved in a forestry-based CCO. 
This blank slate allows an investor to strategically use both tools (and, more 
specifically, to spread the costs of a project across various funding streams). 
This layering, however, can be challenging as the current regulatory frame-
work is not well-designed to account for the unique timing considerations that 
are often important deal considerations for conservation projects: upon initial 
enrollment and for phased projects.
To meet the standards for a qualified conservation easement under the 
ARB protocol, this property interest must be recorded “within a year of the 
project start date either before or after” which limits the window for project 
development.66  Qualification of the conservation easement matters for the 
carbon baseline as well as ARB’s determination of a project’s reversal risk 
rating, both of which have material financial impacts.67  If the conservation 
easement is not recorded during this timeframe, it will not be a qualified con-
servation easement under the protocol.
This timeline is a challenge or barrier because project verification (and 
critically credit issuance) only happens after the initial reporting period.  This 
essentially forces a landowner to assume the risk that the carbon verification 
may not bring the expected results, even if the price of the conservation ease-
ment was reduced in reliance or consideration of the carbon project.  If an 
easement is not ultimately qualified, it will be deemed a preexisting legal man-
date and the impacts of those restrictions will be included in the baseline for 
crediting additional carbon reductions.68  As a result, this timing barrier serves 
as a material bar to trying to sequence a working forest conservation ease-
ment and a forestry-based CCO for a single project.  ARB should provide 
flexibility to landowners and conservation easement-holders by expanding 
this window—provided that ARB has sufficient assurances that these parties 
of preexisting conservation easements); see also Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, 
§ 5.2.1(e)(1)(C) (discussing the impact of prior recorded easements in calculating the carbon 
baseline).
65. Keeton et al., supra note 58, at 19.
66. Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 1.2(a)(44) (providing the requirements 
for “qualified conservation easements); id. at § 3.6(a)(2)(C) (“Any previously recorded con-
servation easement must still meet, or be modified to meet, all of the requirements contained 
in the definition in subchapter 1.2 in order to be considered “qualified.”).
67. See id. at § 3.6(a)(2)(C), Appendix D.
68. Id. at § 3.5 (discussing these timing considerations for assessing additionality and 
in setting the baseline).
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will enter into a working forest conservation easement within a reasonable 
period, including retroactively issuing credits for the initial reporting period 
postrecording.  Such a provision would create better alignment and flexibility 
between these two funding streams, which is critically important to ensuring 
that these conservation finance tools are collectively available, while creating 
no additional project-related risk to ARB.
Second, timing constraints and project definitions also present challenges 
for phased working forest conservation easements.69  Phasing in a conservation 
easement over an entire project area is a strategy often utilized by land trusts 
and timberland investors to allow for conservation of these lands to happen 
gradually (as some of these forest properties can be sizable and require sub-
stantial funding for the purchase of a working forest conservation easement, 
which may require multiple annual funding cycles if relying on public financ-
ing).70  There are likely a number of ways that ARB could address its concerns 
regarding timing and parcel configuration while also ensuring that these ease-
ments are ultimately conveyed, such as by requiring a signed purchase or 
option agreement and/or expanding the time horizon for these projects to actu-
ally be finalized or receive postverification credits.  Any steps in this direction 
would also help maximize the opportunities for both tools to work together in 
a mutually beneficial manner.
3. Post-Forestry-Based CCOs
Finally, if a timberland investor ultimately wants the flexibility to sub-
sequently convey a working forest conservation easement on lands that have 
been enrolled in a forestry-based CCO, it will need to proceed with caution. 
Ensuring the permanence of these credits requires some form of agreement 
(an easement or longterm agreement (100 years)) to ensure the carbon ben-
efits are being protected over this period.71  Depending upon the agreement 
entered into to secure the carbon benefits, this may require demonstrating to 
the conservation funder that additional and significant conservation value still 
remains unprotected in order to support acquisition of the working forest con-
servation easement.
Ultimately, addressing the challenges of layering and sequencing work-
ing forest conservation easements and forestry-based CCOs is one of the 
critical roadblocks limiting increased activity in this area by sustainability-fo-
cused timberland investors.  As discussed, ARB could take a series of targeted 
steps to span this divide, which would spur additional timberland investor par-
ticipation in this market.
69. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 37, at 9 (discussing the requirements 
under Forestry-Based Protocol § 3 related to qualified conservation easement coverage).
70. See CCLT Letter, supra note 40, at 14.
71. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 37, at 8; Forestry-Based Protocol, 
supra note 13, at § 3.5.
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D. Addressing Additional Challenges of Layering Working Forest 
Conservation Easements and CCOs
As discussed, conservation projects of all forms are becoming increas-
ingly complex as the funding sources needed to accomplish conservation at 
scale require collective action and multiple funding streams.72  Beyond the 
timing/sequencing issues discussed above, there are several other consider-
ations that also merit exploration.
1. Remove the Bar Against Lands Protected by Federal Easements 
Participating in Forestry-Based CCO Projects
One additional challenge to timberland investor participation is that 
lands protected by federal conservation easements are currently barred from 
eligibility in the program.73  While this prohibition may make sense for lands 
owned by the federal government in fee simple, it is difficult to see why lands 
protected by federally held or funded conservation easements should be 
barred from participating in the CCO market.  The conservation of these lands, 
while protected by a federal entity as holder, can still be made more restrictive 
with additional layers of protection that are specifically designed to promote 
carbon sequestration.  There is nothing fundamentally unique or different 
about a federally funded conservation easement or involving the federal gov-
ernment as holder that prevents CCO objectives from being achieved on these 
lands.  Allowing lands that are protected by federally held and funded conser-
vation easements would help to facilitate timberland investor participation in 
the carbon market as, given the scale of these protected parcels, these are per-
haps most likely to be owned by a largescale timberland investor.
2. Provide Guidance Regarding the Appraisal Challenges
Appraising a working forest conservation easement can be challeng-
ing to even an experienced appraiser, as it typically requires comparing the 
“before” and hypothetical “after” valuation of a conserved tract to determine 
what the impact of that restriction will be for either the intended sale or dona-
tion.74  When a carbon project is added, the appraisal complexity only grows. 
72. See, e.g., Sally Fairfax et al., Buying Nature: The Limits of Land Acquisition 
as a Conservation Strategy, 204–07 (2005) (exploring the growth of conservation “mega-
deals”).  As these markets develop, carbon stocking levels will increasingly factor into invest-
ment scenarios of sophisticated investors seeking to leverage or benefit from “over-stocked” 
forests.  See Charles D. Kerchner & William S. Keeton, California’s Regulatory Forest Carbon 
Market: Viability for Northeast Landowners, 50 Forest Pol’y and Econ. 70, 72 (2015) (chart-
ing one of the barriers to landowners in this region is their comparatively active land man-
agement).
73. See Forestry-Based Protocol, supra note 13, at § 2.1(c)(5) (providing that CCOs 
“may not include land that is subject to a conservation easement with federal holders.”).
74. Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements and the Valuation Conundrum, 19 
Fla. Tax Rev. 225, 227–31 (2016) (profiling many of the various challenges in appraising 
conservation easements).
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To provide guidance to landowners, timber rights owners, and appraisers, it 
may be worth exploring, in consultation with the Appraisal Institute or another 
professional organization, whether standards or guidance for appraising these 
interests can be developed.75  Continuing education or certification in this area 
could also be added to ensure that sufficient appraiser expertise develops in 
this area to meet the challenges of this unique type of valuation project.
3. Remain Flexible Regarding Easement/Agreement Language
As explored above, the CCO requirements ideally should be flexible 
enough to allow multiple funding streams to work in concert to protect tar-
geted lands that meet the conservation and carbon sequestration goals of 
both the easement purchaser and ARB.76  Beyond the considerations already 
discussed, the actual language required for a “qualified” conservation ease-
ment needs to be developed or evaluated with a similar eye towards flexibility. 
There will likely be growing pains or organizational learning as some ease-
ment holders will take issue with ARB’s required agreement language and, 
conversely, ARB may have concerns over language targeting other resource 
protection goals.77  There is also a debate between the California Wildlife Con-
servation Board and the ARB with regard to what language can be inserted 
into a qualified conservation easement (which is hindering further activity on 
this front). 78  The challenge with multipurpose conservation projects is that the 
differing missions of the funders and stakeholders can result in too much focus 
on narrow distinctions as each seeks to achieve their specific objectives with-
out considering the larger picture.  For working forest conservation easements, 
the carbon goals need to be balanced against the “working” aspect of these 
easements, or sustainable timber production, public access, and other public 
policy considerations.  Flexibility, balancing, and avoiding overly rigid insis-
tence on specific language will help to ensure that these projects achieve their 
75. See, e.g., Appraisal Institute, Valuation of Conservation Easements, http:// 
knowledgecenter.appraisalinstitute.org/all-available-courses/valuation-of- conservation-
easements?qr=1 [https://perma.cc/RUD2-D39R] (offering a course to teach professionals 
about the valuation of conservation easements).
76. On a related note, any disputes regarding certain attributes of working forest con-
servation easements should also be addressed in an even-handed manner with full awareness 
of the actual impact of inclusion or exclusion.  For example, easements that rely on a forest 
management plan should not be penalized or deemed not to qualify based on the fact that 
additional forest management activities can occur in the future, but the role of this plan 
in providing flexibility, while meeting land management objectives as agreed to between 
the landowner and the easement holder, should be recognized with the landowner being 
able to qualify based upon additional benefits provided beyond the minimum baseline.  See, 
e.g., Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the Climate Change Crossroads, 74 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 199, 225–26 (2011) (profiling the trend towards the use of management 
plans to provide needed flexibility).
77. See, e.g., Keeping Maine’s Forests, supra note 16, at 15.
78. See CCLT Letter, supra note 40, at 12–13 (profiling the dispute between ARB and 
WCB on easement language).
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GHG reduction goals in close coordination with the other land management 
objectives being advanced by the grant.  Additionally, the financial goal of the 
timberland investor is also indirectly achieved, which is a prerequisite to gen-
erating investor interest in such projects.
To explore this and many other issues, it may also be worthwhile to 
develop a formal ARB-sanctioned working group, such as an additional sub-
committee under the Independent Emissions Market Advisory Committee 
akin to the existing Subcommittee on Offsets,79 focused on merging or integrat-
ing conservation easements and forestry-based CCOs.  As their use continues 
to expand, it will be critical to work through these important issues as land-
owners, conservation easement holders, and ARB continue to address and 
evaluate more forestry-based CCO projects in the project development and 
project verification phases.
Conclusion
There is an understandable caution in developing, expanding, and modi-
fying the criteria and protocols around forestry-based CCOs to ensure that the 
desired climate benefits are actually being achieved.80  Offset projects, partic-
ularly those involving lands the size and scale of the forest holdings owned by 
timberland investors present a unique opportunity to facilitate working land 
conservation while also addressing the state’s climate-related goals.  However, 
leveraging this expertise and capital will likely involve solving the trans-
actional barriers that currently complicate the linked use of working forest 
conservation easements and forestry-based CCOs.  If these issues are effec-
tively addressed, this may prove to be a significant step towards meeting the 
state’s climate objectives as well as in securing the future of the state’s forest 
economy and working landscape.
79. See, e.g. IEMA Report, supra note 23.
80. Alan Ramo, The California Offset Game: Who Wins and Who Loses?, 20 Hastings 
W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 109, 155–56 (2014); see also Jonathan L. Ramseur, Cong. Res. 
Serv., RL34705, Estimating Offset Supply in a Cap-and-Trade System Program 1 (2010) 
(discussing this issue).  To develop a protocol or to implement changes to a protocol requires 
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), except for changes to quantifica-
tion methodologies which were exempted from the APA by Assembly Bill 32. See Forestry-
Based Protocol, supra note 13, § 1.1(b); see also See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95971–2 (pro-
filing process for creating and approving protocols).

